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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background  
A chief executive officer (CEO) often is viewed as the embodiment of the company, 
responsible for both the successes and failures of all aspects of the organization (Ranft et 
al., 2006). Ranft et al. (2006) further go on in describing the CEO as the “face” of the 
company. It has been shown that especially in a public relations crisis the face of the 
company matters (Gorn et al., 2008). Thus an interesting question arises: are there some 
desirable features that make a good CEO? When a board of directors is facing two good 
candidates merit-wise, is there something appearance related that would tip the scales in 
favor of the other, be it an unconscious decision? Or are some people just “born leaders”, 
having their appearance shaping their way through life? 
Thin slicing is the art where people make inferences from small amount of cues, and these 
snap judgments can be strikingly accurate (Gladwell, 2005). It has been shown that one 
can make accurate assumptions about the electoral winner just by looking at the photos of 
the competing candidates (see e.g. Todorov et al., 2005; Rosar et al., 2008; Berggren et al., 
2010). In a study by Todorov et al. (2005) inferences of competence judged from the faces 
of the candidates on the U.S. congressional elections are enough to accurately predict the 
winner. In the military setting, among top hierarchy positions, facial dominance seems to 
signal the preferential abilities and qualities that are expected from a general (Mueller and 
Mazur, 1996). So could it be that even leadership abilities can be predicted from the face? 
People regularly make trait judgments of others they do not know, but to what extent 
perceived personality traits are accurate, i.e. could a more competent looking individual 
really be more competent? Ambady et al. (2000) report that thin slicing nonverbal behavior 
can result in surprisingly accurate inferences of personality, for example one’s sexual 
orientation. But the conclusion drawn from facial traits can turn out to be inaccurate, as is 
shown in a study by Zebrowitz et al. (1998) where “baby-faced boys defeated the prophecy 
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that they would be intellectually weak by showing higher academic achievement than their 
mature-faced peers”. Porter et al. (2008) report mixed results on the accuracy of predicting 
trustworthiness from people’s faces.  
If people judge others by looks, then one can expect there to be implications on social 
intercourse, which in a simple form would manifest themselves as people avoiding 
interaction with persons deemed threatening, for instance. But it has been shown that looks 
even have an effect on the job-market outcomes, which is an important part of an 
individual’s life and where people expect to be evaluated according to capabilities and 
achievements. The academic literature indicates the existence of a beauty premium, where 
employees are treated unequally based on looks and less attractive employees are 
discriminated by lower earnings (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; French, 2002; Hosoda et 
al., 2003). Looks might also matter in a hiring situation. In a study by Dipboye et al. 
(1975) participants rank bogus resumes of applicants for a managerial position and prefer 
males to females as well as attractive applicants to unattractive ones. Height is also shown 
to have explanatory power towards higher earnings in the work of Judge and Cable (2004), 
and Gladwell (2005) reports that on average the CEO of Fortune 500 companies is about 
7.5 cm taller than the average American man. It seems that the implications of appearance 
are quite omnipresent, and can have substantial effects even on occupational outcomes. 
To date, an extensive amount of the research on appearance and its labor market effects 
has been conducted in the USA and to a great extent analyzes the effect of beauty on social 
outcomes. To my knowledge the facial features and existence of competence or beauty 
premiums in the context of CEOs has not been studied in the Scandinavia. Since business 
cultures differ across the world, the results obtained with US data might not hold in other 
cultures. Thus the study at hand adds to the existing literature by following the lines of 
previous research and testing the attributes of beauty, competence, likability, and 
trustworthiness on Swedish CEOs. 
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1.2. Objectives 
Discrimination in the labor markets has generated immense amount of research by 
economists (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994) but there is fairly little research conducted 
about the broader impact of facial traits beyond beauty in the field of economics or 
corporate finance (Graham et al., 2010). It is not insignificant who leads a company and it 
is given that the board of directors will carefully examine the merits and suitability of CEO 
candidates. Yet, it is interesting to study whether looks still play a role when selecting the 
face of the company. 
In my thesis I aim to find answers to the following research questions: 1) Do more 
competent people also look more competent? 2) Is attractiveness an asset for CEOs? I 
study the facial traits of CEOs from 140 listed Swedish companies. By conducting an 
Internet based survey, I test four different attributes (beauty, competence, likability, and 
trustworthiness) and how these are associated with CEOs. I test whether these features are 
associated more with CEOs or non-CEO control group members and also if large company 
CEOs are seen different from small company CEOs. Further, I examine if more competent 
looking or attractive CEOs earn more, i.e. if there exist competence or beauty premiums. I 
also test if the facial traits of CEOs are related to the performance of the company. 
The analysis is conducted in two ways. First, the pair-wise comparison simply tests if 
either the picture of large company CEO or control group picture is chosen above chance 
for any of the characteristics. Previous research suggests that CEOs are seen as more 
competent and attractive and less likable and trustworthy than non-CEO peers.  When 
comparing CEOs from large companies to those from small companies, large company 
CEOs appear more competent whereas the small company CEO is chosen to be more 
attractive, likable, and trustworthy. (Graham et al., 2010.) As for the relationship between 
CEO facial traits and executive compensation or firm performance, the analysis is 
conducted by ordinary least square regression, which is a common procedure in similar 
studies. The traditional compensation determinants, such as CEO age and tenure, firm size 
and riskiness, performance, and growth opportunities, are used as control variables. 
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Controls for firm performance include firm size and riskiness, growth opportunities as well 
as firm age and leverage. In addition, both regressions control for the industry differences 
by 1-digit SIC codes. 
1.3. Main findings 
To some extent, the results of my study support the existence of a beauty premium in the 
context of Swedish CEOs. When using salary and salary plus bonus as measures of 
compensation, the regressions give statistically significant coefficients for CEO 
attractiveness. One unit increase on the five-point estimation scale of attractiveness 
increases salary by 14.4 per cent and salary plus bonus by 20.2 per cent. However, when 
looking at total compensation, the coefficient is no longer significant. Also, a competence 
premium is found when salary is the dependent variable. When a CEO’s competence score 
rises by one unit his salary increases by 23.2 per cent. The salary plus bonus and total 
compensation regressions do not yield statistically significant results. When measuring the 
effects of CEO traits on firm performance, the regression coefficients are rather small and 
insignificant for all four traits. 
The results from the pair-wise comparisons imply that CEOs are seen as more competent 
and attractive but less likable and less trustworthy than non-CEOs. When comparing large 
company CEOs to small company CEOs, it appears that large company CEOs look more 
competent, and small company CEOs are seen as more attractive, likable, and trustworthy. 
However, these results are not statistically significantly different from the assumption that 
each trait would be equally commonly associated with either person of the pair and thus 
the effect of chance cannot be ruled out. Thus the study does not find any features that 
would distinguish a person as a CEO.  
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1.4. Limitations of the study 
There are some limitations to this study. First, the sample size is relatively small, 
comprising of only 140 CEOs, which is further decreased in the regression analysis to 127 
due to data unavailability. This reduces the possibility to make generalizations to broader 
groups and the results might have been statistically more significant had the sample been 
larger. Also, the sample consists of only male CEOs, which rules out the possibility to 
make generalizations across gender. Secondly, the group making the assessments of the 
CEOs’ facial traits is quite homogenous, comprising mainly of students from Aalto 
University. Thus the average assessments of CEOs do not tell the universal truth of the 
whole population’s average. However, this might not be a severe problem, since Berggren 
et al. (2010) report in their study about the appearance of political candidates that the 
assessments of university students and other respondents are remarkably similar. Hosoda et 
al. (2003) come to a similar conclusion and find in their meta-analytic review on physical 
attractiveness’s effect on job-related outcomes that the magnitude of attractiveness bias is 
similar for student and professional study participants. Lastly, when computing the CEO 
and control person pairs, the most unbiased result would have been achieved if a person 
who was not aware of the purpose of the study had constructed the pairs. This way the 
possibility of any subconscious favoring of the CEO, i.e. matching with a less competent 
looking pair, could have been eliminated. I have, however, made the best effort as in not to 
favor the CEO picture and matching the pairs solely according to appearance similarities. 
1.5. Structure of the study 
My thesis will proceed as follows. Section two introduces the relevant academic research 
on appearance and its relation to social and labor market outcomes. Hypotheses are 
developed in section three, followed by the survey description in section four.  Data and 
methodology are described in section five and results presented in section six. Finally, 
section seven concludes the study and presents suggestions for future research. 
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2. Literature review 
In the following section I am going to go through the relevant literature on how appearance 
affects our judgments of others and how looks play a role in the labor and corporate 
markets. I start with a general glance at the literature concerning inferring character from 
the face, and then discuss the main features of interest, attractiveness and competence, and 
their implications to social and economic outcomes. 
2.1. Inferring character from facial traits 
In order for appearance to have a meaningful and consistent effect on social interactions, 
people need to hold similar ideas of how certain features are judged. Langlois et al. (2000) 
show that “beauty is not in the eye of the beholder”, but rather people do agree on what is 
considered beautiful and what is not. Another important finding of their analyses is that 
people do judge and treat others according to their appearance. Willis and Todorov (2006) 
show that people need only a tenth of a second to make a specific trait inference from 
facial appearance.  
According to Hosoda et al. (2003) available physical cues play an important role in 
categorizing others. By employing our subconscious impressions of others we are guiding 
our actions towards them. This can be observed, for instance, in studies concerning baby-
facedness. A babyish face evokes an impression of warmth, and can be an advantage as 
such, as is shown by Livingston and Pearce (2009), who document that the success of a 
black CEO is related to baby-facedness since it reduces the perception of threat that is 
usually related to blacks.  Further, it has been shown that baby-faced plaintiffs are more 
likely to win cases that involve intentional actions, as this behavior is judged to conflict 
with their character (Zebrowitz and McDonald, 1991). Also impressions of trustworthiness 
have been documented to affect actions in social circumstances. In the context of hedge 
fund management, those managers deemed trustworthy by appearance are able to attract 
greater flows to their funds than similar managers with less trustworthy appearance 
(Pareek and Zuckerman, 2011) and in peer-to-peer lending situations less trustworthy 
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looking borrowers are less likely to obtain a loan than borrowers perceived trustworthy 
(Duarte, Siegel, and Young, 2010).  
However, it could also be that the expectations other people hold of us are self-fulfilling 
prophecies. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) find that a teacher’s expectations of a student’s 
greater intellectual development actually result in that particular student showing greater 
intellectual development, when the teacher pays more attention to the “talented” one.  
2.2. Attractiveness and beauty premium 
Dion et al. (1972) find evidence for the “What is beautiful is good” thesis, when results of 
their experiment show that physically more attractive persons are assumed to possess more 
socially desirable personalities as well as lead happier and more successful lives. But more 
attractive people are not just expected to fare better in life; they actually do fare better, at 
least to some extent. Beauty premiums and plainness penalties have been studied widely. 
Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) report that plain people earn from seven to nine per cent 
less than average-looking individuals, who in turn earn approximately five per cent less 
than good-looking individuals, a result holding for both American and Canadian men and 
women. French (2002) finds that women with above average attractiveness earn 
approximately eight per cent more than their average looking peers.  Biddle and 
Hamermesh (1998) study the graduates from one prestigious law school and find that 
among one cohort of students a significant beauty premium exists among the lawyers after 
five years of graduation.  
It has also been studied how the effect of attractiveness differs across sex. Heilman and 
Stopeck (1985) investigate how an individual’s attractiveness is seen to influence his or her 
occupational success. Their results show that attractive men’s success is more deemed to 
depend on their skills and abilities, whereas for attractive women the advancement on the 
corporate ladder is deemed to depend on other factors than capabilities. Hosoda et al. 
(2003) report that “physical attractiveness is always an asset for both male and female 
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targets, regardless of the sex-type of the job for which they applied or held”. Further they 
state that the effect size of attractiveness is similar for men and women.  
Good looks have been shown to be a competitive advantage also in the field of politics. 
Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara (2010) study the Finnish parliamentary and municipal 
elections to examine if good looks work in favor of the candidate. They ask survey 
participants both in and outside of Finland to rate the images of political candidates, 
judging their beauty, competence, intelligence, likability and trustworthiness. Among the 
non-incumbent candidates beauty is found to have significant explanatory power to the 
candidate’s relative success in the election, a result that holds for both men and women 
candidates. When the beauty of the candidate increases by one standard error, this 
translates into a 20 per cent or 17 per cent increase in the number of votes the candidate 
receives in the parliamentary or municipality elections, respectively. The results of 
Berggren et al. (2010) hold cross-culturally, as both Finnish and non-Finnish respondents’ 
answers yield similar conclusions. Rosar et al. (2008) come to a similar conclusion of the 
importance of beauty to political candidates. They study the German state elections of 
North Rhine-Westphalia and find that the candidate has the most advantage of 
attractiveness if the average candidate attractiveness is low in his or her constituency.  
As there are a number of studies with evidence to support that individuals do benefit from 
attractiveness, an interesting question is whether beauty premiums are only discrimination 
of the less-attractive or if there exists productivity differences, which would justify the pay 
premiums? Beauty may be productive in situations where clients have substantial 
interactions with employees, making discrimination consumer driven. Customers might 
choose to interact with more attractive workers, giving them a competitive advantage 
(Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994). Appearance might also affect confidence and 
communication, which further affects productivity (Engemann and Owyang, 2005). Pfann 
et al. (2000) link executives’ attractiveness to firm performance by studying the Dutch 
advertising industry. The photographs of the executives are rated on attractiveness from 1 
to 5 and then matched to company revenues. Their findings suggest that advertising 
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agencies with more attractive CEOs have higher revenues, and the benefits from higher 
sales exceed the possible cost of higher wages to more attractive executives. However, 
when Graham et al. (2010) match CEO attractiveness ratings to firm performance they find 
no evidence to support that more attractive CEOs are more productive and would add to 
firm performance. Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) find that attractiveness increases self-
confidence which in turn increases wages and employer’s (false) perception of ability. 
Table I below summarizes the key papers on beauty and its social outcomes. One can 
conclude that attractiveness can have profound implications on labor market outcomes but 
it remains uncertain what the extent of productivity differences is, and whether the effect is 
present regardless of culture, industry, organization, or occupation. The paper at hand aims 
to study whether attractiveness is an asset for Swedish CEOs, and whether it affects 
productivity. 
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Table I Summary of key papers on beauty and social / labor market outcomes 
 
Study Sample Method Key findings
Berggren, 
Jordahl, and 
Poutvaara 
(2010)
1 929 Finnish political 
candidates
10 011 respondents rate 
campaign photos for: beauty, 
competence, 
trustworthiness, likability, 
intelligence. 5-point scale
Beauty strongly and significantly 
related to electoral success. Also 
some evidence to support the 
positive effect of competence on 
electoral success. Holds for both 
men and women candidates.
Rosar, Klein, 
and Beckers 
(2008)
512 German political 
candidates 
903 respondents rate 
campaign photos for: 
attractiveness. 7-point scale
The candidate is found to gain most 
from attractiveness when the 
average score or range of 
attractiveness of candidates in the 
same constituency is low. Also, the 
higher the average attractiveness of 
candidates, the higher the turnout 
in a constituency.
Hosoda, 
Stone-
Romero, and 
Coats (2003)
27 papers on physical 
attractiveness and 
job-related outcomes
A meta-analytic review Physical attractiveness is always an 
assets for individuals; students and 
professionals both susceptible to 
attractiveness bias in decision 
making; the attractiveness bias 
seems to be decreasing over time; 
availability of job-relevant 
information does not decrease 
attractiveness bias.
French (2002) 1 692 employees from 
a non-profit hospital 
and a school district
Self-assessment of 
attractiveness on 1) above 
average, 2) average, 3) below 
average appearance
Female employees who judged 
themselves with above average 
appearance earn on average 8% 
more than females with average 
appearance.
Pfann, Biddle, 
Hamermesh, 
and Bosman 
(2000)
1 282 executives of 
Dutch advertising 
agencies.
Two men and one woman 
>40 yrs. old and two men and 
one woman <40 yrs. old rate 
facial photos for: 
attractiveness. 5-point scale
Executives' beauty raises firms' 
sales.
Biddle and 
Hamermesh 
(1998)
Over 4 400 
matriculants from law 
school "X"
A male <35, a female <35, a 
male >35 and a female >35 
yrs. old rate facial photos for: 
attractiveness. 5-point scale
More attractive attorneys earn more 
than others after 5 yrs. of practice, 
and this effect grows with 
experience. Attorneys in private 
sector are better-looking than the 
ones in public sector.
Hamermesh 
and Biddle 
(1994)
3 662 American and 
Canadian workers
Interviewer rates for 
attractiveness. 5-point scale
A beauty premium and plainness 
penalty among both men and 
women.
This table summarizes the main papers referenced in this study of the relationship between beauty and social /
labor market outcomes.
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2.3. CEO characteristics, compensation, and firm performance 
In an exploratory study by Wood and Vilkinas (2005) CEOs assess the characteristics they 
believe make them good leaders, and achievement orientation as well as humanistic 
approach are identified as playing an important role in being a good leader. Since there can 
be identified some features that make one a good leader, recent academic research has 
studied if these abilities and competencies are communicated also through non-verbal 
channels, such as facial appearance. In a study by Graham et al. (2010) the authors have 
participants choose from a pair of pictures, including the faces of a CEO and a non-CEO, 
the one that looks more competent. Further they differentiate with large firm CEOs and 
small firm CEOs. The results show that CEOs from larger companies are actually 
perceived more competent than their non-CEO peers or small company CEOs. Sczesny et 
al. (2006) study how gender-stereotypical physical appearance influences the perceived 
leadership ability and find that stimulus persons with a masculine appearance as opposed 
to feminine appearance are judged to possess higher leadership abilities. The results apply 
to both male and female stimulus persons. Thus it could be that there is something in the 
human face that the public reads as leadership ability. 
When looking at the implications of these perceived competencies, these judgments are 
even shown to benefit the CEOs by translating into higher compensation. In a paper by 
Rule and Ambady (2009), where they ask a group of naïve college students to rate the 
faces of female CEOs from Fortune 1,000 companies, the female CEO’s perceived 
dominance has predictive power towards her compensation. Graham et al. (2010) also have 
participants rate the faces of CEOs on a 5-point scale, and the competence ratings of CEOs 
are matched with executive compensation. They find evidence that supports the existence 
of a competence premium. 
If a CEO is awarded for more competent looks by higher compensation, it is just to ask 
whether the competence is only a perceived ability by the outsiders or if it actually depicts 
true character and yields results to the organization. Rule and Ambady (2008 & 2009) 
conduct two studies to separately analyze both male and female CEOs’ facial traits and 
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their predictive power towards company performance.  In both studies a group of naïve 
college students rate the faces of Fortune 1,000 companies’ executives. The results show 
that the perception of leadership ability and competence predicts the amount of profits the 
company makes. Graham et al. (2010), on the other hand, report the opposite results. In 
their study, the more competent looking CEO does not seem to yield any additional 
payoffs to the firm since there is no link found between a more competent looking CEO 
and better firm performance. The results of similar research on charismatic CEO’s 
influence on firm performance are somewhat vague and mixed. In the work of Agle et al. 
(2006) the authors find association between organizational performance and subsequent 
perceptions of CEO charisma but no evidence supports the association the other way 
around, i.e. CEO charisma and subsequent organizational performance. Waldman et al.’s 
(2001) results link CEO charisma to firm performance only under uncertain environmental 
conditions. Tosi et al. (2004) do not find any evidence on the relationship between CEO 
charisma and any measure of firm performance. Thus it seems that more research is needed 
in the field of CEO characteristics and firm performance to form a better understanding on 
this relationship. Table II summarizes the key papers on perceived CEO competence in 
relation to compensation and firm performance. In my thesis I aim to add to the existing 
literature by investigating the existence of competence premiums among Swedish CEOs 
and by studying whether more competent looking CEOs are performing better. 
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Table II Summary of key papers on CEO appearance and firm performance/executive compensation 
 
  
Study Sample Method Key findings
Graham, 
Harvey, 
and Puri 
(2010)
87 CEO-non-CEO 
pairs, 61 large-small 
company CEO 
pairs, 138 individual 
CEOs
1 527 university students 
rate facial photos for: 
competence, attractiveness, 
likeability, trustworthiness; 
facial maturity. 5-point scale
CEOs are perceived more competent and 
attractive but less likable and 
trustworthy than non-CEOs. Large 
company CEOs perceived more 
competent but less likable, attractive 
and trustworthy than small company  
CEOs. Also a competence premium was 
found. Babyfacedness negatively 
correlated with competence and 
positively with likability.
Rule and 
Ambady 
(2009)
20 female CEOs of 
U.S. Fortune 
1,000:2006
170 university students rate 
facial photos for: 
competence, dominance, 
likeability, facial maturity, 
trustworthiness; global 
assessment of leadership 
ability ("How successful 
would she be in leading a 
company?"). 7-point scale
Perceptions of competence and 
leadership ability significantly 
positively correlated with company 
profits. Perceptions of dominance 
significantly related to CEO cash and 
total compensation.
Rule and 
Ambady 
(2008)
25 highest and 25 
lowest ranked 
companies of U.S. 
Fortune 500:2006
100 university students rate 
facial photos for: 
competence, dominance, 
likeability, facial maturity, 
trustworthiness; global 
assessment of leadership 
ability ("How successful 
would he be in leading a 
company?"). 7-point scale
Power (competence, dominance, facial 
maturity) and leadership significantly 
related to company profits. CEOs from 
more versus less successful companies 
could be distinguished via naive 
judgements based on facial appearance.
Sczesny, 
Spreeman, 
and 
Stahlberg 
(2006)
A masculine and a 
feminine male and 
female stimulus 
person
72 university students 
assess each photo on 
several aspects, incl. 
leadership characteristics 
(e.g. "Do you consider this 
person dominant?")
More masculine looking persons are 
perceived to possess higher leadership 
abilities.
This table summarizes the main referenced papers of the relationship between appearance and perceived
competence as well as company performance/executive compensation
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3. Hypotheses 
In this section I will develop my hypotheses, which I derive from the literature presented in 
section two. The purpose of my thesis is to study how attractiveness, competence, 
likability and trustworthiness are associated with Swedish CEOs and whether these traits 
are linked to executive compensation or firm performance. 
CEO is ultimately the person responsible for the management of an organization, and it is 
given that they are individuals with high abilities and competencies. One could also argue 
that a larger organization brings with it a more complex ensemble, thus requiring even 
more from the CEO. One of the research questions of my thesis is whether more competent 
people also look more competent? In their work Graham et al. (2010) find that CEOs from 
large companies are perceived to be more competent than non-CEOs or CEOs from small 
companies. Thus I hypothesize the following. 
Hypothesis 1: CEOs look more competent than non-CEOs 
Hypothesis 2: Large company CEOs look more competent than small 
company CEOs 
The importance of attractiveness on job-related success has been documented widely (see 
e.g. Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998; French, 2002). A person who has become a CEO can 
be considered having succeeded in his career, and could be expected to have gained from 
attractiveness. Thus I hypothesize that good looks are also related to the success of CEOs, 
and that they are perceived more attractive than non-CEOs. 
Hypothesis 3: CEOs are perceived to be more attractive than non-CEOs 
Apart from influencing how other people perceive us, appearance communicates 
something that translates even into our wages. The academic literature has documented the 
existence of a beauty premium (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; French, 2002; Hosoda et 
al., 2003), and Tosi et al. (2004) link CEO charisma with higher total compensation 
packages. Most close to the study at hand is the paper of Graham et al. (2010) whose 
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results show a relationship between CEO competence rating and higher executive 
compensation. Deriving from these I expect the CEOs ranked more competent or attractive 
to have higher compensation. 
Hypothesis 4: CEOs with higher competence ratings have higher 
compensation 
Hypothesis 5: CEOs with higher attractiveness ratings have higher 
compensation 
The evidence concerning the link between CEO’s perceived character and firm 
performance is more controversial. Graham et al. (2010) find no evidence that CEO’s 
perceived competence would result in higher firm performance and Tosi et al. (2004) do 
not find evidence that CEO charisma would be positively related to firm performance. A 
study by Pfann et al. (2000), however, reports that firms with more attractive executives 
generate higher revenues, and Rule and Ambady’s (2008 & 2009) papers give similar 
results, showing that judgments of competence predict company profits. As long as the 
competence rating tells only about the perceived competence and not about the true 
competence, the looks of the CEO should be irrelevant to the performance of the company. 
Thus I hypothesize the following. 
Hypothesis 6: The perceived CEO competence does not affect firm 
performance 
Hypothesis 7: The perceived CEO attractiveness does not affect firm 
performance 
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4. Survey 
To test my hypotheses I conduct an experiment where I do pair-wise comparisons of 
photographs of CEOs and control persons on the attributes of attractiveness, competence, 
likability, and trustworthiness. I further collect personal ratings for each CEO on these four 
attributes. This is a common approach utilized in similar studies, and college students are 
used widely as a target group to answer the survey (see e.g. Rule and Ambady, 2008 & 
2009; Graham et al., 2010). I will next go through the process of conducting the survey, 
from collecting the pictures of CEOs and control group to matching the pairs and 
executing the survey. 
4.1. CEO sample 
Since it is critical that the survey participants do not recognize the persons they are rating, I 
cannot use Finnish companies as my sample group as their CEOs are expected to be fairly 
commonly known to the students of Aalto University, who are the target participants of my 
survey. It is good, however, that the appearance or “race” does not differ greatly from that 
of the respondent so that the respondent can easily make judgments according to 
competence, attractiveness, trustworthiness, and likability. For that reason I choose 
Swedish CEOs, who share the Scandinavian appearance, to be my sample group. 
I start by retrieving a list of all listed Swedish companies from Thomson ONE Banker and 
obtain 449 companies with financial observations. I sort the companies from smallest to 
largest according to sales. I choose companies from as different ends of the size spectrum 
as possible in order to emphasize the effect of size difference, and in the end a company is 
defined small if its yearly sales fall below SEK 630 million. The sales of large companies 
range between SEK 1.5 billion and SEK 265 billion. I use data from 2010 to make sure I 
have the necessary financial statement information available for all firms. In case the fiscal 
year of any company differs from the calendar year, then the one overlapping most with 
year 2010 is chosen. I look for the picture of the CEO from the company’s website or 
annual report from 2010. In case I do not find a usable picture I use the Google Image 
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search engine. I eliminate those cases where the CEO was replaced during the observation 
year 2010. Also, there are only a few companies with a female CEO and since they are not 
enough to make generalizations I decide to concentrate only on male CEOs to preserve 
homogeneity in the sample. 
4.2. Control group sample 
In order to focus on the facial trait differences, the control group pictures need to be as 
similar as possible to the pictures of the CEOs. That is, both pictures are business-like, 
having a conventional pose, the persons have similar hair styles, both use glasses, both are 
bearded, belong to the same ethnic group and so on. I find that Swedish universities, law 
firms and consulting firms publish photos of their employees on their websites that serve 
the purpose of a control picture. Even though persons from these groups undoubtedly are 
successful and competent, it is worthwhile to study whether the qualities and characters 
they possess differ from those a CEO possesses. Here I also employ the Google Image 
search engine. 
4.3. Matching pairs and survey composition 
I match the pairs according to age, facial expressions (smile/neutral), facial hair (beard/no 
beard) etc. Further, I use Adobe Photoshop to cut out the background from the pictures and 
crop them to facial shots, in order to minimize any bias or noise and assure that the viewer 
is able to concentrate on facial trait differences. Further, I adjust the photo sizes of each 
pair (keeping it so that the picture qualities are similar) to make them proportionally as 
close to each other as possible, that neither of their heads would appear bigger, which 
could create a bias.  
I am able to match 83 CEO–non-CEO pairs and 74 large company CEO–small company 
CEO pairs. I also collect personal ratings for 87 large company CEOs and 53 small 
company CEOs. I divide the questions into five different surveys so that the amount of 
questions is limited to approximately 60 and the survey is not too exhausting. Each survey 
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has approximately 32 pair-wise comparisons, both CEO–non-CEO pairs and large 
company CEO–small company CEO pairs, and 28 personal rating questions. All questions 
appear on their own page. In the pair-wise comparisons, the respondent is asked to choose 
the picture of the person who he/she feels is more a) attractive, b) competent, c) likable, 
and d) trustworthy. Figure I illustrates a pair-wise comparison question.  
Figure I Example of a pair-wise comparison question 
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I randomly assign the order in which the (large company) CEO appears, i.e. is he A or B in 
the pair comparison. Since I have five different surveys, I am able use the same control 
picture more than once, but keeping it so that each control photo appears only in one pair 
in each survey. In the personal rating questions, the respondent is asked to rate the person 
on a scale from 1 to 5, 5 being the highest score, according to attractiveness, competence, 
likability, and trustworthiness. Figure II shows an example of personal rating question.  
Figure II Example of a personal rating question 
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4.4. Survey execution 
I conduct an Internet based survey using the Webropol-tool. I contact the students of Aalto 
University by email asking them to participate in the survey. Each email includes a link to 
one of the five surveys. Later on I post the link to the survey that has received least 
answers on my Facebook page. Altogether the surveys generate 887 usable answers. If 
someone had checked the box stating they recognize either of the persons, that observation 
is removed. The start page of the survey asked a few background questions from the 
respondents, and it can be seen from Appendix 1. Table III summarizes the respondent 
demographics according to the background questions. 54 % of the respondents are women 
and about half belong to the age group of 21-25 years old.  
Table III Summary statistics of surveys 
 
  
Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4 Survey 5 Total
Female 92 99 88 115 83 477
Male 73 84 79 93 81 410
Age
-20 20 17 17 27 23 104
21-25 80 97 91 109 76 453
26-30 45 41 42 50 39 217
31-35 9 11 7 14 10 51
36- 11 17 10 8 16 62
Finnish 161 182 165 207 160 875
Other 4 1 2 1 4 12
N 165 183 167 208 164 887
This table summarizes the demographics of survey respondents. The questions were divided
into five different Webropol surveys. Survey participants are mainly students of Aalto
University, who were contacted by email. Answers were collected in March-April 2012.
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5. Data and methodology 
I will start this section by describing the methodology and then move on to the description 
of the variables used in the regression analyses as well as their descriptive statistics. 
Finally I go through some basic assumptions of linear regression models and how they 
hold in the current study. 
5.1. Regression analyses 
To study whether CEO’s facial traits affect CEO compensation or firm performance I 
conduct two different regression analyses. The linear regression analysis is a commonly 
used method to analyze the predictive power one variable has on the other, and its results 
are fairly easily interpreted. I use the ordinary least square (OLS) regression method to 
analyze the relationship between CEO’s facial traits and both compensation and firm 
performance. I conduct the following two regression models: 
  (            )
      (                          )    (             )    (              )
   (              )    
Where 
β0 = intercept coefficient 
β1(CEO facial trait variables) = the average rating for each CEO on attractiveness, 
competence, likability, and trustworthiness 
β2(CEO variables) = control variables for CEO age and tenure 
β3(firm variables) = control variables for size, riskiness, growth opportunities, and 
performance 
β4(industry dummy) = one-digit SIC code industry dummy 
ε = disturbance term 
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      (                          )    (              )
   (              )    
Where 
β0 = intercept coefficient 
β1(CEO facial trait variables) = the average rating for each CEO on attractiveness, 
competence, likability, and trustworthiness  
β2(firm variables) = control variables for size, riskiness, growth opportunities, leverage, 
and firm age 
β3(industry dummy) = one-digit SIC code industry dummy 
ε = disturbance term 
5.2. Dependent variables 
Compensation research usually analyzes the effect a certain variable has on compensation 
in the light of three different measures of compensation that are salary, total cash 
compensation (sum of salary and annual bonus) and total compensation (see e.g. Core et 
al., 1999; Carter et al., 2010). Thomson ONE Banker reports executive level remuneration 
data, which I used to obtain the figures for total fiscal compensation. This includes base 
salary, possible bonuses and other compensations as well as pension costs and restricted 
stock awards. Since Thomson ONE Banker does not report the breakdown to different 
components of pay for all executives, I refer to the company’s annual report from 2010 for 
the salary and cash compensation figures. I take the natural logarithm of the compensation 
measures to be used in the regression analysis in order to reduce the skewness of the size 
distribution. 
As for firm performance, Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) are widely used in 
academic research as a proxy for performance (see e.g. Mehran, 1995; Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Barontini and Caprio, 2006). Graham et al. (2010) use ROA as a performance 
measure in their study, so it is used as a proxy for performance in my thesis as well. I 
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employ Thomson ONE Banker’s Worldscope Fundamentals figures, which are calculated 
as (net income + interest expense) / total assets. To be exact, I use the industry-adjusted 
ROA, which I calculate for each firm by subtracting the mean ROA for the industry from 
the firm’s ROA. Industry mean ROA is the weighted average of all firms with the same 
two-digit SIC code. For those cases where there are only one or two firms representing a 
specific industry on a two-digit SIC code level, I use one-digit SIC codes to calculate the 
industry average. Table IV presents the dependent variables.   
Table IV Description of dependent variables and their source 
 
5.3. Control variables 
CEO compensation is shown to depend on several executive-level and firm-level 
characteristics. CEO’s age and CEO’s tenure in the current firm are widely used as control 
variables (see e.g. Fich, Starks, and Yore, 2010; Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos, 2010). 
Custódio et al. (2010) argue that more recently hired CEOs will have their compensations 
adjusted to recent market conditions, and thus a negative relationship should exist between 
tenure and compensation. As for the firm characteristics, executive pay should be tied to 
performance in order to mitigate the agency problem. A positive relationship between 
performance and executive pay has been documented for example by Murphy (1985) and 
different proxies for performance, such as return on assets and stock return, both 
contemporaneous and lagged, are widely used (see e.g. Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos, 
2010; Carter, Franco, and Tuna, 2010). One of the well documented relationships is the 
positive relationship between firm size and executive compensation (see e.g. Baker, Jensen, 
Compensation measure Source
Salary Fixed and noncontingent pay component Annual report for 2010
Total cash compensation Salary plus bonus Annual report for 2010
Total compensation Salary, bonus, other compensation, LTIP, 
restricted stock awards
Thomson ONE Banker
Performance measure
ROAAdj Company ROA minus industry average 
ROA, measured at two-digit or one-digit 
SIC code level
Thomson ONE Banker
24 
and Murphy, 1988), and proxies such as total assets and sales are used to estimate firm 
size. The ideology behind the size and compensation relationship is that the executive 
should be rewarded for being in charge of a larger and more complex organization. Larger 
companies may also attract better qualified and better paid CEOs (Baker, Jensen, and 
Murphy, 1988). Smith and Watts (1992) document a positive relation between growth 
opportunities and compensation policies. Market-to-book ratio, research and development-
to-sales ratio as well as the ratio of capital expenditures to firm value are widely used as 
proxies for growth/investment opportunities (e.g. Harvey and Shrieves, 2001; Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Smith and Watts, 1992). Lastly, I include firm risk as a 
control variable, as it is argued that managers should be compensated for bearing the non-
diversifiable compensation risk which increases with firm risk (see e.g. Smith and Watts, 
1992). Carter, Franco, and Tuna (2010) use the standard deviation of a firm’s stock returns 
over the prior two years, and even though longer periods (5 years) are also used to account 
for risk (see e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003), I use the two-year period to avoid my sample 
shrinking too much. There are companies that do not have this data available, and even the 
use of a two-year time period eliminates 13 companies from my sample. I also employ 
one-digit SIC codes as industry dummies. 
In the literature on firm performance, vastly the same firm-level control variables occur as 
on executive compensation. Barontini and Caprio (2006) control for size, growth, and 
leverage whereas Anderson and Reeb (2003) add a few variables, controlling for firm size, 
growth opportunities, risk, leverage, and firm age. Both studies control for the industry 
effects by a dummy. Table V summarizes the control variables used in this study. For all 
variables a logarithmic transformation is applied when it is meaningful. 
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Table V Description of control variables and their source 
 
5.4. Descriptive statistics 
The facial traits of the CEOs were rated by survey participants on a scale from 1 to 5, 
which gives an average score of 3 for the estimation scale. From table VII it can be 
observed that the respondents have been most strict when assigning scores on 
attractiveness. Attractiveness trait has the lowest independent score of all four traits at 1.48 
and also the lowest mean score at 2.54, which is lower than the estimation scale average. 
This can be expected since the respondents are from a different demographic group than 
the CEOs, and individuals in their twenties might not see males in their plus forties so 
attractive. On average, the CEOs received a competence rate of 3.32, which is the highest 
mean score of all four traits and competence trait received also the highest independent 
rating of 4.08. The ratings of likability and trustworthiness are distributed close to the 
estimation scale average. The inter-rater reliability is tested by calculating Cronbach’s 
alphas for all traits, which are reported below in table VI. Commonly used rules of thumb 
for interpreting the values of alphas are that when 0.8 ≤ α ≤ 0.9 the internal consistency is 
considered good and when α ≥ 0.9 the consistency is considered excellent (see e.g. George 
and Mallery, 2000). Thus the respondents in my study seem to agree to a great extent about 
the traits of each CEO, most about the attractiveness, which has an alpha of 0.9. 
Compensation specific Source
CEO age CEO's age in years Thomson ONE Banker, Google search engine
CEO tenure CEO's tenure in years in current company Thomson ONE Banker, company's webpage, 
Google search engine
Performance ROA, ROAt-1 Thomson ONE Banker
Stock return, stock return t-1, calculated as the 
buy and hold stock return 
Datastream
Performance specific
Leverage Long-term debt / total assets Thomson ONE Banker
Firm age Number of years since the firm's incorporation Orbis database
Common 
Firm size Total assets Thomson ONE Banker
Risk Standard deviation of monthly stock returns for 
prior 24 months
Datastream
Growth opportunities Market value of equity / book value of equity Thomson ONE Banker
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Table VI Inter-rater reliability, Cronbach’s alphas  
 
As for the descriptive statistics of the control variables, the CEOs in the sample are on 
average 52 years old and have been on the executive position for 6 years, on average. The 
average salary and total compensation of sample CEOs in 2010 were SEK 4 million and 
SEK 7.6 million, respectively. There are quite a few companies in the sample that have 
their roots date back to the early stages of industrialization (one company even as early as 
1413), thus raising the average age of the companies to 58 years. The sizes of company 
assets range between SEK 11.8 million and SEK 306 billion. 
Cronbach's alpha
Attractiveness 0.9049
Competence 0.8109
Likability 0.8201
Trustworthiness 0.8034
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Table VII Descriptive statistics of regression variables 
 
 
In order to analyze if female and male respondents perceive the CEOs similarly, I employ 
the independent samples t-test and find that only in the assessment of attractiveness the 
mean scores are statistically different for male and female respondents (p-value <0.001). In 
other words, on average, male respondents assign a statistically higher score for 
attractiveness of the CEOs. I further test the statistical differences in mean scores for large 
and small company CEOs. The only statistically significant difference is found among the 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Attractive  2.5352  0.5261  1.4802  3.7835
Competent  3.3184  0.3232  2.5625  4.0847
Likable  3.1194  0.3667  2.2475  3.8509
Trustworthy  3.0593  0.3523  2.1910  3.7640
Total compensation ( '000 SEK) 7 613 7 726 470 42 200
Salary + bonus ( '000 SEK) 5 619 5 388 605 25 300
Salary ( '000 SEK) 4 037 3 088 605 14 000
CEO age (years) 52.6299  7.1490 34 70
CEO tenure (years)  6.4331  5.6084 1 34
ROAAdj  -0.0481  0.1737  -1.1480  0.2326
ROA  0.0234  0.1762  -1.1357  0.3398
ROAt-1  0.0028  0.1812  -0.7018  0.6324
Stock return  0.1884  0.4274  -0.9412  1.3660
Stock returnt-1  0.7992  0.8714  -0.7018  5.6835
Firm age (years)  58.1417  81.0949 4 597
LT debt / total assets  0.1559  0.1611 0 0.8039
Market / book  2.2432  9.2541  -86.4070  51.3523
Market / bookt-1  2.8010  4.2268  0.4295  40.3682
Volatility  0.1746  0.1825  0.0566  2.0692
Total assets ( '000 000 SEK) 20 300 46 300  11.800 306 000
Nr of observations 127
This table presents the data used in this study across 127 Swedish companies. The trait ratings for
CEO’s attractiveness-trustworthiness were collected through an Internet-based survey (altogether 887
respondents), and they take a value between 1 and 5. Other executive and firm level data were gathered
from different data-bases, and observation year t is 2010. Total compensation includes salary, bonus,
long-term incentive plan, pension expenses as well as other remuneration. ROAAdj is calculated by
subtracting the industry mean ROA from the firm's ROA. Stock return is the buy and hold return over
the year. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the prior 24 months. 
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competence ratings, where large company CEOs have a statistically significantly higher 
mean score (p=0.0135). Table VIII below presents the descriptive statistics for trait ratings 
according to respondent gender and company size.  
Table VIII Descriptive statistics of CEO traits by sub-groups 
 
  
Panel A Female respondents, all CEOs
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Attractive  2.4317 0.5570  1.4433  3.8349
Competent  3.3149 0.3323  2.5747  4.1122
Likable  3.1355 0.4053  2.0909  4.0241
Trustworthy  3.0608 0.3844  2.1000  3.8276
Nr of observations 127
Panel B Male respondents, all CEOs
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Attractive  2.6557 0.5042  1.5250  3.9014
Competent  3.3160 0.3264  2.4810  4.0704
Likable  3.0951 0.3370  2.3667  3.7179
Trustworthy  3.0523 0.3327  2.2747  3.7722
Nr of observations 127
Panel C Large company CEOs, all respondents
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Attractive  2.5290 0.4873  1.6477  3.7835
Competent  3.3668 0.3067  2.7657  4.0847
Likable  3.1327 0.3281  2.3116  3.7550
Trustworthy  3.0850 0.3401  2.3030  3.7640
Nr of observations 80
Panel D Small company CEOs, all respondents
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Attractive  2.5457 0.5918  1.4802  3.7600
Competent  3.2360 0.3369  2.5625  3.9444
Likable  3.0968 0.4274  2.2475  3.8509
Trustworthy  3.0156 0.3718  2.1910  3.6625
Nr of observations 47
This table presents the CEO facial trait ratings data grouped according to different company or
respondent criteria. Panels A and B make a difference by the respondent's sex, panel A reporting the
data obtained from female respondents and panel B the ratings from male respondents. In panels C
and D the CEO facial trait ratings are differentiated by company size, panel C depicting the ratings
for large company CEOs and panel D for small company CEOs. The ratings were collected from 887
survey participants and take a value between 1 and 5.
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5.5. Assumptions of OLS 
An important assumption behind the efficiency of OLS estimators is homoscedasticity, 
meaning that the variance of the disturbance terms is constant across all observations. 
Should heteroscedasticity be present in the model, one cannot draw reliable conclusions 
from the hypothesis testing procedures (Gujarati and Porter, 2010). A starting point for 
analyzing the heteroscedasticity of the model is to plot the residuals versus the fitted 
values, and look for a pattern in the plots. The scatterplots for performance regressions (not 
reported here) show a nonrandom pattern, thus implying that heteroscedasticity might be 
present. For further analyses, White’s general test for heteroscedasticity is a commonly 
employed way for detecting heteroscedasticity in a model, and the test results I obtain for 
all compensation regressions indicate that the models are not subject to heteroscedasticity 
(p-values > 0.4). However, the low p-values of the tests on performance regressions 
indicate the possibility of heteroscedasticity. For this reason I will employ robust standard 
errors in the regressions in order to mitigate the issue of heteroscedasticity. 
Another assumption behind linear regression analysis is that there is no perfect 
multicollinearity, meaning no exact linear relationship among explanatory variables. If 
multicollinearity was present, one could not obtain unique estimates of all parameters, and 
hence would fail to draw any statistical inferences about the results (Gujarati and Porter, 
2010). Practically, the multicollinearity is rarely perfect, and thus the degree of 
multicollinearity is usually tested and were it on a high enough level, one would expect 
multicollinearity to be an issue. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is a widely used 
measure for testing the degree of multicollinearity. A common rule of thumb is that VIF 
values greater than 5 indicate severe multicollinearity among variables (Studenmund, 
2006). From table IX it can be seen that the VIFs for the explanatory variables used in my 
analyses stay well below 5. Another sign of multicollinearity can also be the high pairwise 
correlation among explanatory variables. Gujarati and Porter (2010) state that with a 
pairwise correlation in excess of 0.8 the possibility of severe multicollinearity exists. Table 
XI reports the correlation coefficients for all regression variables used in this study, and the 
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highest correlation between two explanatory variables is 0.72 for ROA and ROAt-1. Other 
correlation values between explanatory variables stay below 0.56. Drawing from both VIF 
and correlation coefficient values I do not expect multicollinearity to be a serious problem 
in the used models.  
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Table IX Variance inflation factors (VIF) for explanatory variables 
 
 
Attractive 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.09
Competent 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.17
Likable 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.12
Trustworthy 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.10
Ln(CEO age) 1.86 1.39 1.40 1.40 1.86 1.39 1.40 1.40 1.86 1.39 1.40 1.40
Ln(CEO tenure) 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
ROA 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76
ROAt-1 2.59 2.59 2.69 2.65 2.59 2.59 2.69 2.65 2.59 2.59 2.69 2.65
Stock return 1.31 1.31 1.33 1.32 1.31 1.31 1.33 1.32 1.31 1.31 1.33 1.32
Stock returnt-1 1.85 1.89 1.86 1.86 1.85 1.89 1.86 1.86 1.85 1.89 1.86 1.86
Market / book t-1 1.10 1.10 1.12 1.12 1.10 1.10 1.12 1.12 1.10 1.10 1.12 1.12
Volatility 2.52 2.49 2.49 2.49 2.52 2.49 2.49 2.49 2.52 2.49 2.49 2.49 1.30 1.31 1.32 1.31
Ln(Total assets) 1.86 1.88 1.85 1.85 1.86 1.88 1.85 1.85 1.86 1.88 1.85 1.85 1.70 1.73 1.71 1.71
Ln(Firm age) 1.41 1.43 1.41 1.41
LT debt / total assets 1.56 1.53 1.53 1.55
Market / book 1.25 1.24 1.26 1.24
This table presents the variance inflation factors for the independent variables used in regressions
Ln(Salary) Ln(Salary+Bonus) ROAAdjLn(Total compensation)
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6. Results 
The results of my study are presented in the following section. I start by going through the 
results of the pair-wise comparisons between (large company) CEOs and (small company 
CEO) control group and then I move on to the results concerning the relationship between 
CEO appearance and both compensation and firm performance.  
6.1. Pair-wise comparisons 
I matched CEOs from large companies into pairs with non-CEOs and CEOs from small 
companies. I asked survey participants to choose between the two pictures the one they felt 
was more attractive, competent, likable, and trustworthy.  The purpose was to find out if 
(large company) CEOs are seen different from the control group. In a similar study by 
Graham et al. (2010) the authors found that survey respondents picked the CEO to be more 
competent and attractive and less likable and less trustworthy than their non-CEO pair. 
Between large company CEOs and small company CEOs, the large company CEO was 
perceived more competent whereas the small company CEO was chosen more often for the 
other attributes. 
Table X reports the results from the pair-wise comparisons. From panel A, which depicts 
the comparisons between CEOs and non-CEOs, it can be seen that the CEO was chosen 
52.6 percentage of time to be more attractive and 51.9 percentage of time as more 
competent of the pair. The characteristics of likability and trustworthiness were more often 
associated with the non-CEO control person, and the respondents picked the CEO 48.3 
percentage of time for being more likable and 49.2 percentage of time for more 
trustworthy. When comparing large and small company CEOs, the large company CEO 
was seen as more competent 53.1 percentage of time.  The small company CEO was 
chosen more often to be the more attractive, likable and trustworthy one of the two. My 
results imply a similar pattern as is found by Graham et al. (2010), but unlike their results 
mine fail to report any statistically significant deviation from the null hypothesis that the 
probability of picking the (large company) CEO would be 0.5. There does not seem to be 
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any facial characteristics that would be common to the CEOs and the assignment of each 
trait between the CEO and control person is subject to chance. 
Table X Results of pair-wise comparisons 
 
6.2. Correlation coefficients 
I will start the analysis on the relationship between executive compensation, firm 
performance and CEO characteristics by looking at the correlations between the variables. 
Table XI reports the Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the variables used in this study. 
From the table it can be observed a moderate yet positive and significant relationship 
between competence and all three measures of compensation. Salary, total cash 
compensation, and total compensation have a correlation coefficient with competence of 
0.27, 0.24, and 0.25, respectively. The correlation coefficients between the rest of the traits 
and compensation measures are low and insignificant.  As for the relationships between 
firm performance and CEO facial traits, likability and trustworthiness show significantly 
positive correlation with the industry adjusted ROA. The coefficients are, however, quite 
Panel A: CEO vs. non-CEO Attractive Competent Likable Trustworthy
Straight average % 52.5576 51.8804 48.2917 49.1748
(0.8995) (1.0656) ( -0.9899) (-0.4791)
Nr of pairs 83 83 83 83
Nr of respondents 887 887 887 887
Panel B: Large vs. small Attractive Competent Likable Trustworthy
Straight average % 46.4631 53.1069 48.4960 49.9344
(-1.2053) (1.4787) ( -0.6455) (-0.0275)
Nr of pairs 74 74 74 74
Nr of respondents 887 887 887 887
This table presents the results of the pair-wise comparisons. Facial pictures of a large company CEO
and a non-CEO control person were paired and survey participants were asked to choose between
the pictures the one they felt was more a) attractive, b) competent, c) likable, and d) trustworthy.
Panel A illustrates the percentage of times the CEO was chosen for each trait. The same comparison
was conducted with large company CEO and small company CEO, and Panel B reports the
percentage of times the large company CEO was chosen for each trait. T-values, which test the
hypothesis that the probability of picking the (large company) CEO is 50 %, are reported in
parentheses.  
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low at 0.22 for attractiveness and 0.18 for trustworthiness. Among the control variables a 
few well documented relationships can be observed: the positive and strong correlation 
between firm size and CEO compensation and the positive relationship between 
performance measures and compensation. The correlations between volatility and 
compensation as well as tenure and compensation are significant, but the opposite of what 
is expected. With regard to the significant correlations between firm performance and 
control variables, size correlates positively with performance while measures of risk as 
well as growth opportunities correlate negatively with performance, as expected. Firm age 
shows a positive association to firm performance, which is the opposite of that suggested 
by previous research. 
35 
 
Table XI Correlation coefficients 
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Ln(Salary)
Ln(Salary+Bonus) 0.97***
Ln(Total compensation) 0.96*** 0.98***
ROAAdj
Attractive 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.15
Competent 0.27** 0.24** 0.25** 0.17 0.41***
Likable 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.22** 0.44*** 0.18*
Trustworthy 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.18* 0.15 0.48*** 0.75***
Ln(CEO age) 0.10 0.10 0.13 -0.55*** -0.05 -0.17 -0.04
Ln(CEO tenure) 0.14 0.20** 0.22**  -0.10 -0.06 0.05 0.01 0.28**
ROA 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.15 0.15 0.23** 0.16 -0.12 0.20**
ROAt-1 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.38*** 0.24** 0.15 0.35*** 0.26** -0.18* 0.19* 0.72***
Stock return 0.26** 0.30*** 0.30*** -0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.28** 0.29*** 0.16
Stock returnt-1 0.06 0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.12 -0.12 -0.13 0.18* -0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.04
Market / book t-1 -0.00 0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.10 0.11 -0.14 0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 -0.08
Volatility -0.18* -0.20* -0.23** -0.41*** -0.08 0.03 -0.19* -0.18* 0.17 -0.22** -0.40*** -0.45*** -0.22** 0.55*** -0.04
Ln(Total assets) 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.53*** 0.03 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.26** 0.56*** 0.47*** 0.27** 0.00 -0.07 -0.26**
Ln(Firm age) 0.33* 0.06 0.22** 0.04 0.10 -0.20** 0.48***
LT debt / total assets 0.03 -0.10 0.07 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.29*** 0.05
Market / book -0.32*** -0.12 -0.12 -0.17 -0.16 0.05 -0.14 -0.11 -0.32***
This table shows the Pearson's correlation coefficients among each regression's variables.  *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at p<0.05, p<0.025, and p<0.001significance level, respectively. 
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6.3. Regression results 
The following subsections will present the results from the multivariate regression analyses 
that are used to analyze the effect of CEO facial traits on compensation and firm 
performance. Effects on compensation are analyzed through three different measures of 
compensation, and the results from each regression are reported in their own subsection. 
Final subsection presents the results from firm performance regressions. 
6.3.1. Salary 
Table XII reports the results from the regressions that analyze the effects of CEO’s facial 
traits on compensation, as measured by salary. From the four tested appearance attributes, 
beauty and competence are found to have a significant effect on CEO’s salary. On the five-
point estimation scale, an increase of one unit on attractiveness rating translates into 14.4 
per cent (100*(e
0.1341
-1)) increase in salary, whereas one unit increase in competence rating 
translates into 23.2 per cent (100*(e
0.2086
-1)) increase in salary. Both are significant at the 
10 per cent significance level. These results support the existence of a beauty and 
competence premium among Swedish CEOs that were hypothesized earlier in section 
three. The effects of likability and trustworthiness on compensation are extremely small 
and insignificant. When including all traits to the same regression, competence seems to 
hold strongest explanatory power, yet all trait coefficients are insignificant. However, as 
there are some high pair-wise correlations among the traits (see table XI), including all 
attributes to the same regression might skew the results. 
With regard to the control variables, only total assets seem to have a highly significant 
effect on compensation; a one per cent increase in total assets increases CEO salary by 
approximately 0.32 per cent. This result is significant at the 1 per cent level. Both market-
to-book ratio and volatility have a positive relation to salary, as expected by previous 
research, but their effects are insignificant. Stock market and accounting measures of 
performance show somewhat mixed results on the relationship to salary, which is expected 
to be positive, but here again the results are insignificant.  
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Table XII Results on CEO’s facial traits’ effect on salary 
 
Pred. 
Sign
Attractive (+)  0.1341  0.0493
(1.81)* (0.39)
Competent (+)  0.2086  0.2518
(1.94)* (1.36)
Likable (?)  0.0092  0.0658
(0.09) (0.29)
Trustworthy (?)  -0.0047  -0.1693
 (-0.05) (-0.70)
Ln(CEO age) (+)  0.0402  -0.2307  -0.2380  -0.2393  -0.0809
(0.13) (-0.86) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.24)
Ln(CEO tenure) (-)  -0.0612  -0.0497  -0.0576  -0.0576  -0.0558
(-1.37) (-1.12) (-1.27) (-1.27) (-1.24)
ROA (+)  0.0025  0.0176  -0.0027  -0.0035  -0.0041
(0.01) (0.06) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
ROAt-1 (+)  -0.2375  -0.2300  -0.1821  -0.1724  -0.2093
(-0.85) (-0.82) (-0.63) (-0.60) (-0.73)
Stock return (+)  -0.1264  -0.1290  -0.1306  -0.1298  -0.1248
(-1.42) (-1.45) (-1.44) (-1.43) (-1.39)
Stock returnt-1 (+)  0.0618  0.0456  0.0603  0.0598  0.0414
(1.24) (0.90) (1.19) (1.18) (0.80)
Market / book t-1 (+)  0.0062  0.0067  0.0062  0.0063  0.0079
(0.79) (0.85) (0.77) (0.79) (0.98)
Volatility (+)  0.0140  0.0696  0.0984  0.0698  0.0331
(0.05) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.12)
Ln(Total assets) (+)  0.3185  0.3159  0.3211  0.3212  0.3158
(17.58)*** (17.34)*** (17.52)*** (17.49)*** (17.21)***
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
 0.8185 0.8193  0.8131 0.8131 0.8228
N 127 127 127 127 127
Ln(Salary)
This table presents the OLS regression results from the sample of 127 Swedish companies and
their CEOs. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of CEO salary. The variables
attractiveness-trustworthiness are the average scores assigned to each CEO by survey
participants, taking a value between 1 and 5. ROA is the return on assets ratio as reported by
Thomson ONE Banker. Stock return is the buy and hold return over the fiscal year. Volatility is
the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the prior 24 months. Industry effects are
depicted by a one-digit SIC code industry dummy. T-values are reported below each coefficient
in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 %
significance levels, respectively. 
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CEO’s age has a positive effect only when regressed with attractiveness, and otherwise 
seems to hold a negative association to salary. However, the results are insignificant. 
Lastly CEO tenure shows somewhat small, negative, yet insignificant association to salary.  
The R
2
 is relatively high in all regressions, around 0.81, implying that the variables jointly 
explain a high amount of compensation variance. However, since only a few independent 
variables are significant, this could be a symptom of multicollinearity. Yet in section 5.5 
the regressions were tested for multicollinearity and according to the tests this 
phenomenon should not be a severe issue.  
To test the robustness of the results, I replace a few of the control variables with an 
alternative measure. Size is measured by sales rather than total assets, and capital 
expenditures over total assets depict the growth opportunities. Tobin’s Q assesses the firm 
performance. I re-run the regressions and the size of the attractiveness coefficient remains 
on the same level, but becomes insignificant (0.1194, t=1.10). Competence coefficient 
increases both in size and significance (0.3593, t=2.38). Likability coefficient becomes 
larger but remains insignificant (0.1098, t=0.82). A major change occurs on the 
trustworthiness coefficient, when the coefficient becomes positive and gains both in size 
and significance (0.1953, t=1.45). CEO age and tenure as well as performance measure 
have signs as expected by previous research, but are all insignificant. Both CAPEX/Total 
assets and Ln(sales) have positive and significant coefficients at the one per cent 
significance level. Volatility is now negatively associated with compensation, but the result 
is insignificant. All in all, the robustness check gives support to the hypothesis that there is 
a link between appearance and compensation, albeit that now only the existence of a 
competence premium is supported rather than both beauty and competence premiums as 
was the case in the original regression. 
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6.3.2. Total cash compensation 
Table XIII shows the regression results of facial traits’ effect on compensation when the 
dependent variable is salary plus bonus payments. Now only the coefficient of 
attractiveness is significant of the four tested facial trait attributes, and one unit increase in 
attractiveness rating translates into 20.2 per cent (100*(e
0.1842
-1)) increase in total cash 
compensation. The result is significant at the five per cent significance level and supports 
the existence of a beauty premium among sample CEOs. The effect of competence on 
compensation is now somewhat smaller than when regressed on salary, and is now also 
insignificant. The coefficients of likability and trustworthiness imply a negative association 
to compensation, yet their effects remain insignificant. The inclusion of all attributes in to 
the same regression yields insignificant coefficients for all traits. As stated before, due to 
the relatively high pair-wise correlations between trait variables, the inclusion of all traits 
might give skewed results. 
Among the control variables, total assets is still showing a strong, positive and significant 
relation to compensation, and a one per cent increase in total assets increases total cash 
compensation by approximately 0.36 per cent. Market-to-book ratio also has a positive 
effect on compensation, with coefficient values that range between 0.019 and 0.021 and 
are statistically significant at the five per cent level. The effects of size and growth 
opportunities are in line with previous research. The coefficient of volatility is positive as 
expected, yet insignificant. Here again the effects of stock market and accounting measures 
of performance on compensation are mixed and insignificant. CEO age and tenure 
coefficients are somewhat mixed but highly insignificant. Again the variables jointly 
explain a high amount of compensation variance, with R
2
 values of around 0.81. 
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Table XIII Results on CEO’s facials traits’ effect on total cash compensation 
 
Pred. 
Sign
Attractive (+)  0.1842  0.1607
(2.09)** (1.08)
Competent (+)  0.1379  0.1257
(1.06) (0.57)
Likable (?)  -0.0253  -0.0009
(-0.22) (-0.00)
Trustworthy (?)  -0.0980  -0.1748
 (-0.85) (-0.61)
Ln(CEO age) (+)  0.1661  -0.2126  -0.2246  -0.2016  0.1533
(0.45) (-0.66) (-0.69) (-0.62) (0.38)
Ln(CEO tenure) (-)  -0.0034  0.0068  0.0020  -0.0015  -0.0039
(-0.06) (0.13) (0.04) (-0.03) (-0.07)
ROA (+)  0.2659  0.2721  0.2587  0.2426  0.2484
(0.75) (0.76) (0.72) (0.68) (0.70)
ROAt-1 (+)  -0.4266  -0.3773  -0.3223  -0.2810  -0.3407
(-1.29) (-1.12) (-0.93) (-0.82) (-1.00)
Stock return (+)  -0.0367  -0.0410  -0.0401  -0.0377  -0.0297
(-0.35) (-0.38) (-0.37) (-0.35) (-0.28)
Stock returnt-1 (+)  0.0657  0.0536  0.0620  0.0604  0.0518
(1.11) (0.88) (1.02) (1.00) (0.84)
Market / book t-1 (+)  0.0194  0.0198  0.0198  0.0205  0.0215
(2.09)** (2.09)** (2.07)** (2.15)** (2.26)**
Volatility (+)  0.1339  0.2105  0.2149  0.2078  0.1386
(0.41) (0.64) (0.65) (0.63) (0.42)
Ln(Total assets) (+)  0.3588  0.3590  0.3624  0.3635  0.3580
(16.72)*** (16.36)*** (16.61)*** (16.69)*** (16.42)***
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
 0.8147 0.8093  0.8074 0.8085 0.8178
N 127 127 127 127 127
Ln(Salary+Bonus)
This table presents the OLS regression results from the sample of 127 Swedish companies and
their CEOs. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of CEO total cash compensation,
which is the sum of salary and annual bonus. The variables attractiveness-trustworthiness are
the average scores assigned to each CEO by survey participants, taking a value between 1 and 5.
ROA is the return on assets ratio as reported by Thomson ONE Banker. Stock return is the buy 
and hold return over the fiscal year. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns 
for the prior 24 months. Industry effects are depicted by a one-digit SIC code industry dummy.
T-values are reported below each coefficient in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent the
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % significance levels, respectively. 
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The robustness check includes the same variable replacements as described in the previous 
subsection and all regressions are re-run with these alternative control variables. The 
attractiveness coefficient remains again on same level but falls in significance (0.1752, 
t=1.39). The results suggest a greater competence premium, which is now also significant 
at the 10 per cent significance level (0.3152, t=1.78). Likability and trustworthiness 
coefficients are now positive but still insignificant (0.1263, t=0.82; 0.1612, t=1.03). Size 
and growth opportunities are always positively and significantly related to compensation. 
CEO age and tenure and firm performance measures behave as expected but do not always 
reach statistical significance. The coefficient of volatility is negative and insignificant. The 
overall results from the robustness checks support the link between appearance and 
compensation. However, different from the original regression, the pay premium seems to 
derive from competent looks rather than attractiveness. 
6.3.3. Total compensation 
When using the total compensation as the dependent variable, all four facial trait 
coefficients are now insignificant, as can be seen from table XIV. However, the 
coefficients of attractiveness and competence are still implying a positive association to 
compensation and their t-values (1.56 for attractiveness and 1.53 for competence) are 
significant at the 20 per cent significance level. The coefficients of likability and 
trustworthiness are implying a small, negative effect on compensation but the coefficients 
are highly insignificant. When including all traits to the same regression, competence has 
the largest coefficient, but all trait coefficients are still insignificant. 
Total assets is the only control variable having a significant coefficient in all regressions. A 
company that is ten per cent larger as measured by total assets will pay its executive 
approximately 3.9 per cent more in total compensation, a result that is significant at the 1 
per cent significance level.  
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Table XIV Results on CEO’s facial traits’ effect on total compensation 
 
Pred. 
Sign
Attractive (+)  0.1450  0.0757
(1.56) (0.48)
Competent (+)  0.2060  0.2362
(1.53) (1.02)
Likable (?)  -0.0098  0.0305
(-0.08) (0.11)
Trustworthy (?)  -0.0275  -0.1626
 (-0.23) (-0.54)
Ln(CEO age) (+)  0.2476  -0.0462  -0.0577  -0.0506  0.1490
(0.64) (-0.14) (-0.17) (-0.15) (0.35)
Ln(CEO tenure) (-)  -0.0066  0.0051  -0.0024  -0.0035  -0.0016
(-0.12) (0.09) (-0.04) (-0.06) (-0.03)
ROA (+)  0.0826  0.0970  0.0769  0.0724  0.0761
(0.22) (0.26) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20)
ROAt-1 (+)  -0.0889  -0.0756  -0.0144  -0.0047  -0.0416
(-0.25) (-0.22) (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.12)
Stock return (+)  0.0099  0.0070  0.0066  0.0071  0.0138
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12)
Stock returnt-1 (+)  0.0260  0.0098  0.0236  0.0232  0.0056
(0.42) (0.15) (0.37) (0.37) (0.09)
Market / book t-1 (+)  0.0154  0.0159  0.0156  0.0158  0.0173
(1.57) (1.62) (1.56) (1.58) (1.73)*
Volatility (+)  0.1787  0.2389  0.2408  0.2384  0.1974
(0.52) (0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.57)
Ln(Total assets) (+)  0.3871  0.3848  0.3899  0.3902  0.3844
(17.09)*** (16.85)*** (17.08)*** (17.07)*** (16.70)***
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
 0.8230 0.8228  0.8190 0.8191 0.8259
N 127 127 127 127 127
Ln(Total compensation)
This table presents the OLS regression results from the sample of 127 Swedish companies and their
CEOs. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation, which is the sum of
salary, annual bonus, long-term incentive plans, pension expenses and other remuneration. The variables
attractiveness-trustworthiness are the average scores assigned to each CEO by survey participants, taking
a value between 1 and 5. ROA is the return on assets ratio as reported by Thomson ONE Banker. Stock
return is the buy and hold return over the fiscal year. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock
returns for the prior 24 months. Industry effects are depicted by a one-digit SIC code industry dummy. T-
values are reported below each coefficient in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent the statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % significance levels, respectively. 
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The coefficients of market-to-book ratio, volatility, and stock market and accounting 
measures of performance (except for the previous year’s ROA) are positive as expected by 
previous research. These results are, however, insignificant apart from the effect of market-
to-book ratio in the last column of table XIV. The effects of CEO age and tenure are 
somewhat mixed but again highly insignificant. The R
2
 is relatively high in all regressions, 
and the independent variables jointly explain about 82 per cent of the total variance in the 
compensation variable. 
Robustness check is done in the same manner as explained earlier, with a few variable 
changes. The coefficient of attractiveness does not really change in size but becomes 
insignificant (0.1436, t=1.08). Competence coefficient doubles in size and is significant at 
the five per cent significance level (0.3913, t=2.11). Likability and trustworthiness are now 
positively associated to compensation, and trustworthiness is close to becoming significant 
at the 10 per cent significance level (0.1750, t=1.07; 0.2636, t=1.61).  Firm size and growth 
opportunities are positively linked to compensation, and significant at the one per cent 
significance level. CEO age has a positive and significant effect on compensation at the 10 
per cent significance level, while firm performance has a positive, yet insignificant 
coefficient. The effects of volatility and CEO tenure are negative and insignificant. The 
robustness tests indicate that some facial features do explain compensation and give 
support to the existence of a competence premium. 
6.3.4. Firm performance 
The effects of CEO’s facial traits on firm performance are tested by regression analysis, 
which employs robust standard errors to mitigate the problem of heteroscedasticity, and the 
results are reported in table XV. All facial traits have a small, positive, yet insignificant 
effect on firm performance, which is measured by industry adjusted ROA. These results 
support the hypotheses that more competent or attractive looking CEOs do not actually add 
to the performance of their companies when compared to less competent or attractive 
looking CEOs.   
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Table XV Results on CEO’s facials traits’ effect on firm performance 
 
  
Pred. 
Sign
Attractive (?)  0.02365  -0.0134
(1.14) (-0.40)
Competent (?)  0.0389  0.0645
(0.88) (0.88)
Likable (?)  0.0416  0.0931
(1.18) (1.06)
Trustworthy (?)  0.0245  -0.0737
(0.73) (-0.81)
Ln(Firm age) (-)  0.0065  0.0052  0.0073  0.0067  0.0057
(0.67) (0.54) (0.76) (0.69) (0.57)
LT debt / total assets (-)  -0.2129  -0.2273  -0.2221  -0.2327  -0.2065
(-2.37)** (-2.50)** (-2.48)** (-2.55)** (-2.29)**
Market / book (-)  -0.0058  -0.0059  -0.0058  -0.0059  -0.0057
(-1.40) (-1.43) (-1.39) (-1.41) (-1.40)
Volatility (-)  -0.2275  -0.2365  -0.2186  -0.2237  -0.2355
(-4.69)*** (-4.97)*** (-4.56)*** (-4.68)*** (-4.77)***
Ln(Total assets) (+)  0.0325  0.0317  0.0318  0.0321  0.0308
(4.50)*** (4.42)*** (4.49)*** (4.43)*** (4.53)***
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
 0.4782  0.4780  0.4804  0.4757  0.4870
N 127 127 127 127 127
This table presents the OLS regression results with robust standard errors from the sample of 127
Swedish companies and their CEOs. The dependent variable is the industry adjusted return on assets,
which is obtained by subtracting the industry average ROA from the company ROA. The variables
attractiveness-trustworthiness are the average scores assigned to each CEO by survey participants, taking
a value between 1 and 5. Firm age is measured as the time in years since the company's inception.
Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the prior 24 months. Industry effects are
depicted by a one-digit SIC code industry dummy. T-values are reported below each coefficient. *, **,
and *** represent the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % significance levels, respectively.
ROAAdj
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Apart from firm age and market-to-book ratio, the control variables are significant and 
their effects are as expected by previous research. Volatility is negatively associated with 
performance and the coefficients are around -0.22 and -0.23, while the coefficients of firm 
size are about 0.03 and show a positive relation to performance. Both are significant at the 
one per cent significance level. Long-term debt / total assets ratio has a negative effect on 
firm performance and the coefficient values vary around -0.21 and -0.23. The models 
explain a bit less than 50% of the variance in the dependent variable, as measured by R
2
. 
The robustness of these results is tested by replacing the dependent variable ROAAdj by 
Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is calculated as follows: 
            
(                                                        )
            
 
The replacement changes the coefficients of all CEO traits from positive to negative but 
they are still statistically insignificant, which supports the hypothesis that CEO appearance 
does not explain firm performance. However, now the control variables, that were 
significantly explaining the firm performance as measured by the industry adjusted ROA, 
are no longer significant. 
 
  
46 
7. Conclusion 
On the one hand, my thesis aimed to study the effects of CEO appearance on CEO 
compensation and firm performance. The analysis was carried out with OLS regressions, 
with salary, total cash compensation, total compensation and industry-adjusted return on 
assets as dependent variables and the tested CEO appearance attributes were attractiveness, 
competence, likability, and trustworthiness. My sample consisted of Swedish CEOs and 
primary data on CEOs’ appearance attributes were collected through an Internet based 
survey. On the other hand, I investigated whether the looks of (large company) CEOs 
differed from those of the control group. This was analyzed by comparing facial pictures of 
CEOs and non-CEOs as well as large and small company CEOs on the same four 
appearance attributes. The pair-wise comparisons data were also collected through the 
surveys. Altogether the surveys generated 887 answers. 
According to the pair-wise comparisons, the CEO picture is chosen more often than the 
picture of a non-CEO when judging attractiveness and competence, whereas the non-CEO 
is chosen more often for being more likable and trustworthy. When comparing large and 
small company CEOs, large company CEO is picked 53 percentage of time when the 
competence is judged, while small company CEO is chosen 54 percentage of time for 
attractiveness. The small company CEO is also more often judged as more likable and 
more trustworthy. The results of my study are parallel to the results of a similar study by 
Graham et al. (2010) but unlike their results, mine are not statistically significantly 
different from chance. Thus the results from my study do not suggest that there would be 
some facial traits that are common for CEOs or that more competent people would look 
more competent. 
Academic research has found evidence for both beauty and competence premium 
phenomena (e.g. Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; French, 2002; Graham et al., 2010). The 
results from my regression analyses support to some extent the existence of beauty and 
competence premiums among Swedish CEOs. When the dependent variable is salary or 
total cash compensation, the attractiveness explains significantly the compensation of the 
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CEO. Competence rating, on the other hand, has a significant effect on CEO salary. When 
regressed with total compensation, both attractiveness and competence coefficients are 
significant only at the 20 per cent significance level. Thus it seems that the compensation 
committee, who sets the executive compensation, is most subject to the attractiveness and 
competence biases when setting the level of executive base salary. Table XVI summarizes 
the hypotheses and how the results support them. 
Table XVI Summary of hypotheses and results 
 
As the current study focused only on male CEOs it would be interesting to study whether 
the results remain the same for female CEOs. Since the number of female CEOs can be 
rather small in just one country, as was the case for Swedish companies, one could 
consider a larger geographic area to obtain a large enough sample. Additionally, since the 
pair-wise comparisons did not yield significant results, it could be that the control sample 
used in my study did not differ enough from the CEOs. To analyze more thoroughly if 
looks guide our way through life, and specifically, if looks affect occupational success, a 
control group consisting of people without a university degree would give more room for 
analysis. Here, however, a challenge is in obtaining business-like photos of Joe Averages 
to be used in the comparisons.  
Hypothesis Empirical evidence
Hypothesis 1 : CEOs look more competent than non-
CEOs
No support. The results do not reach 
statistical significance
Hypothesis 2 : Large company CEOs look more 
competent than small company CEOs
No support. The results do not reach 
statistical significance
Hypothesis 3 : CEOs are perceived to be more attractive 
than non-CEOs
No support. The results do not reach 
statistical significance
Hypothesis 4 : CEOs with higher competence ratings 
have higher compensation
Moderate support. When compensation is 
measured by salary, a competence premium 
exists
Hypothesis 5 : CEOs with higher attractiveness ratings 
have higher compensation
Moderate support. When compensation is 
measured by salary or total cash 
compensation, a beauty premium exists
Hypothesis 6 : The perceived CEO competence does not 
affect firm performance
Strong support. Trait coefficient is highly 
insignificant
Hypothesis 7 : The perceived CEO attractiveness does 
not affect firm performance
Strong support. Trait coefficient is highly 
insignificant
This table summarizes how the results support the hypotheses
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